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Safety and Mission Assurance Performance Metric
Relevant data are presented in formats that help managers make decisions.
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas
The safety and mission assurance
(S&MA) performance metric is a
method that provides a process
through which the managers of a large,
complex program can readily under-
stand and assess the accepted risk, the
problems, and the associated reliability
of the program. Conceived for original
use in helping to assure the safety and
success of the International Space Sta-
tion (ISS) program, the S&MA per-
formance metric also can be applied to
other large and complex programs and
projects. The S&MA-performance-met-
ric data products comprise one or
more tables (possibly also one or more
graphs) that succinctly display all of
the information relevant (and no infor-
mation that is irrelevant) to manage-
ment decisions that must be made to
assure the safety and success of a pro-
gram or project, thereby facilitating
such decisions.
S&MA organizations within NASA
have traditionally provided data prod-
ucts that target specific stages of the life
cycles of projects and are generally inde-
pendent of each other. Such data prod-
ucts have included (1) critical-items lists
(CILs) generated through failure-
modes-and-effects analyses (FMEAs);
(2) noncompliance reports (NCRs) —
more specifically, reports of noncompli-
ance with safety requirements as re-
vealed through safety-oriented analyses
and reviews; and (3) problem reporting
and corrective action (PRACA) docu-
ments, which are used in tracking and
classifying hardware failures that occur
during testing, assembly, and opera-
tions. Notwithstanding the value of
these data products, it is difficult to as-
sess the effects on the overall program
or project from the contents of such a
data product considered by itself. Prior
to the conception of the S&MA per-
formance metric, there was no process
for integrating the individual S&MA
data products into a data product that
could enhance the decisions of pro-
gram managers.
The S&MA-performance-metric pro-
cess is one of gathering information
generated according to the various
S&MA disciplines (for example, data
products like those described above).
The gathered information is differenti-
ated into four categories:
• Accepted Risk — This category includes
information from CILs and NCRs. The
critical items and noncompliances can
be classified against specific affected
subsystems of the ISS or other system
that is the focus of the program or
project.
• Anomalies — For the purpose of S&MA,
anomalies are defined as hardware or
software failures, or adverse discrete
events that have occurred during devel-
opment and operation of the system.
Anomalies include the subject matter of
PRACA reports and of the correspon-
ding reports for software, denoted S/W
PRs. The PRACAs and S/W PRs can also
be classified against specific subsystems.
• Capability Reliability — This category is
particularly relevant to the ISS because
the ISS is being assembled in stages over
a period of several years, and its configu-
ration and required capabilities for each
stage are different. A predicted-reliability
analysis is performed for each capability,
and consequently for each stage. This
analysis is based on the planned times
between assembly flights, the predicted
failure rates of the components, the sys-
tem architecture, the profile of opera-
tions for each stage, and data pertaining
to failures observed in flight.
• Subsystem/Capability Dependencies — The
final piece of the ISS S&MA metric is
the dependency of subsystem and stage
capabilities. One relies on the ISS sub-
systems to realize the capabilities re-
quired at each stage. This dependency
of capabilities upon subsystems pro-
vides an integrated system perspective
that helps in the correlation of capabil-
ity performance with anomalies and ac-
cepted risk across subsystems.
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For steady-state solutions, CTAP re-
turns single values (temperatures,
heat flows, and/or mass flows) that de-
scribe the state of the cryogenic sys-
tem. For transient solutions, CTAP re-
turns rates of change of pressure and
density, so that EASY5x can update the
pressure and density accordingly at
each time step, then pass new values of
pressure, density, and any other pa-
rameters (e.g., external temperature)
that might change with time back to
CTAP.
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